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OF JUDICIAL FREEDOM AND JUDICIAL
CONSTRAINT: THE VOICE OF LOUISIANA'S
JUDGE ALBERT TATE, JR.*
PAUL

R. BAIERt

I think it a noble and pious thing to do whatever we may by
written word and molded bronze and sculptured stone to keep
our memories, our reverence, and our love alive and to hand
them on to new generations all too ready to forget. 1

*

Address delivered at the Albert Tate, Jr. Seminar: Bridging Acade

mia, The Bench

& The Bar, Commemorating The Distinguished Life and Career

of Albert Tate, Jr., May 9, 1987, Louis J. Roussell Auditorium, Loyola University,
New Orleans.

Thanks to Christopher J. Roy, Sr., first Chair of the Bill of Rights

Section, Louisiana State Bar Association, for envisioning the Seminar in memory
of Judge Tate, to Governor Edwin Edwards, Chief Justice John A. Dixon, Jr.,
Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham, Clare Tate, the Tate family, and the host of
judges and lawyers who participated, and to Chancellor B.

K Agnihotri and

Southern University Law Center for co-sponsoring the Seminar.

After twenty

years, we renew our memories, our reverence, our love and hand them on to new
generations eager to learn from the past.
Editors' Note:

The Board of Editors of the Southern University Law Review is

pleased to publish Professor Baier's memorial portrait of Judge Albert Tate, Jr.,
who was a great friend of Southern University Law Center, its Faculty and stu

dent body, and a notable contributor to the history-making first volume of our
Law Rev iew his brilliant expose, The Justice Function of the Judge, 1 S.U. L.
REV. 250 (1975). We thank Professor Baier for favoring us with his address,
which he has annotated for publication here. As a new generation, we are hon
ored to remember, not to forget, Judge Tate in this way. We also thank T he
-

Times-Picayune fo r its financial support to the Law Review and for its courtesy in
providing the photographic frontispiece, the same image projected on to the stage
at

the conclusion of Professor Baier's speech.

It v iv idly evokes memory of its

amazing subject.

t

George M. Armstrong, Jr. Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law

Center, Louisiana State University. Member of the Louisiana Bar. Judicial Fel

low, Supreme Court of the United States, 1975-76; Executive Director, Louisiana
Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 1987-1991;
Scholar in Residence, Louisiana Bar Foundation, 1990-92; Distinguished Profes

sor, Louisiana Bar Foundation, 2004. Editor, MR. JUS TI CE AND MRs. BLACK: THE
M�:MOIRS OF HUGO L. BLACK AND ELIZABETH BLACK (Random House, 1986); LIONS
UNDER THE THRONE: THE EDWARD DOUGLASS WHITE LECTURES OF CIIlEF JUSTICES
WARREN E. BURGER AND WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST (La. Bar Found., 1995). Vice
Chairman, Bill of Rights Section, Louisiana State Bar Association.

Secretary,

Supreme Court of Louisiana Historical Society.
1.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., lpswitch, At the Unveiling of Memorial

Tablets (July 31, 1902), in THE OCCASIONAL SPEECHES

OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL

HOLMES 136 (Mark De Wolfe Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1962).
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The other day I reached for a volume of the Federal Re

porter, 2d Series, in search of some point or other of the law-I
forget which. My eye caught the name of Albert Tate, Jr., on the
spine of the report.2 We are all familiar with the countless num
ber of judicial memorials, published in endless volumes of reports
that line the walls where we work. 3
The sight of Judge Tate's name in gold letters draped in
black made me wince at the thought of dying young with so much
energy wasted away. We all know the disbelief of losing Judge
Tate, especiall y Claire, his companion in life. Their home on Oc
tavia Street is empty without him. It seems only yesterday that
his exuberance for life and his big smile filled our hearts with joy.

Al Tate was extraordinary.4 His human spirit enveloped all
who knew him with love.5 His voice was galvanic.

In Memoriam, Honorable Albert Tate, Jr., 798 F.2d XCI (1986).
LL.B. 1947, Yale Law School.
Certificate in Civil Code Studies, Louisiana State University Law School, 1948.
Married Claire Jenmard, of Ville Platte, 1949. Country lawyer, with L. 0. Fusil
ier, Ville Platte, 1948-54. Elected, Louisiana Court of Appeal First Circuit,
1954; Presiding Judge, Louisiana Court of Appeal Third Circuit, 1960-70.
Elected, Louisiana Supreme Court, 1970-79. Delegate, Louisiana Constit utional
Sworn in, upon President
Convention of 1973; Chair, Committee on Style.
2.

Born Opelousas, Louisiana, September 23, 1920.

Carter's commission, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, No
vember 2, 1979.

Died March 27, 1986; survived by Claire and five children,

Albert III (Father Jules), Emma Adelaide, George J., Michael F., and Charles E.
3.

Such memorials, Judge Tate poignantly recognized, manifest an

e ternal ideal of justice:
And so today we reverence not only our departed friends, but
through them the judicial power they exercised in the name of
all the American people, present, past, and future. In ceremo
nies such as these, in time beyond our contemplation, the
members of the legal profession will gather to pay their re
spects to the eternal ideal of justice, and both we and those
who have already departed will in communion with them in
those solemn moments render our silent account to our God of
our joint stewardship of the heritage of American justice.
Albert Tate, Jr., The Role of the Judge in the American Republic, 16 LA. L. Ri-:v.

386, 390 (1956).
Judge Tate's colleague on the Louisiana Supreme Court, his good
4.
friend Justice James L. Dennis, explains:
The example of Judge Albert Tate, Jr., as a jurist, writer,
teacher, colleague, and human continues to sustain us even af-
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I remember seeing him in a small cubicle at New York Uni
versity where he taught the Appellate Ju dges Seminar in the
summer.6 He was surrounded by stacks of books, his green visor

ter his death.

Undoubtedly, his judicial opinions and legal

commentary constitute the most significant contribution by an
individual to the jurisprudence of Louisiana.

Although only

his contemporaries could know fully the intensity, the honesty,
and generosity of his personality, his written works remain as
a source of strength and inspiration for future generations.

James L. Dennis, Foreword to REFLECTIONS ON LAW, LAWYERING, & JUDGING:
THE ESSAYS & ARTICLES OF JUSTICE ALBERT TA TE , JR. ix (George W. Pugh, Jr.,
ed., Pugh Inst. for Justice, La. State Univ. Law Ctr., 2006).
Warren M. Billings, Historian of the Louisiana Supreme Court, cap
tures Judge Tate's persona precisely in his Con fessions of a Court Historian:
One had only to be in the presence of Judge Tate but a short
while to recognize him as one of God's rare creatures. A small
ish, rumpled man, he mingled earthiness with an innate knack
for friendliness and storytelling that immediately drew one to
him.

Those characteristics belied a formidable mind and a

broad erudition, to which he joined an acute sense of Louisiana
history and the place of his profession in it.

Warren M. Billings, Con fessions of a Court Historian, 35 LA. HIST. 261, 262
( 1994).
5.
"Al was a great leader, and a great teacher." John A Dixon Jr., In
Memoriam, Honorable Albert Tate Jr., 61 TuL. L. REV. 711, 712 (1987). Chief
.fuAtice Dixon said of his great friend and colleague:
But Al Tate's character and personality are what endeared
him to everyone touched by his life. Judge Tate had a genuine
love for people-collectively and individually.
people by name than anyone I ever saw.

He knew more

He never failed to

speak to students, law clerks, and other young people.

All

kinds of people came to him with their troubles, and he alway s
listened. Even up i n Shreveport people knew Al Tate. A little
paper up there called the Upstate printed a full page editorial
about him last week, called The Nicest Genius You Ever Met.

Id. at 713 (citing Baudouin, The Nicest Genius You Ever Met, Upstate (Shreve
port. La), April 24, 1986, at 10). "Of all the judges I have known, Al also had the
lnrgest heart for mankind as well as for each and every human being. He really
cared." Mack E. Barham, In Memoriam, Albert Tate, Jr. Judge of the Fifth Cir
ruit Court of Appeals, 1979-1986 Associate Justice, Supreme Court of Louisiana,
1970-1979, 47 LA. L. REV. 921, 921 (1987).
6.
Judge Tate first attended the Seminar as a young appellate judge
and later became a stalwart member of its teaching faculty and a good friend of
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jutting out from his forehead.

Perhaps you know the image I

have in mind. And what was he doing while others had escaped
to Washington Square and beyond? A thousand miles from home,
he was writing an article on his beloved Acadiana. 7
I owe much to Judge Tate.

Fifteen years ago w hen Piper

was in the Gerry Carrier he urged me to transplant my family to
Louisiana soil.

Al Tate loved LSU's Law School and he advised

me to join its faculty.

''You'll have fun," he said.

Judge Tate's

confidence in me helped dispel the moments of self-doubt and dis
trust that come to us all.

His undying example lifts our spirits

still.
Now to my academic duty. I am honored to be listed on the
program as the only professor given leave to speak. I propose to
prove to you that Louisiana's Judge Albert Tate, Jr., was-first

Robert A. Leflar, Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Arkansas
and Director of the Appellate Judges Seminar, Institute of Judicial Administra
tion, New York University. See Albert Tate, Jr. , Bob Lefiar's Impact on the Ju

dicial Process, 25 ARK. L. REV. 95 (1971).

[T]he ten days or two weeks of discussion with fellow judges, in
the peaceful atmosphere of a university and away from the
pressing demands of the docket, offer an exhilarating opportu
nity to think and talk and read and dream about first things,
and to come away refreshed with a clearer understanding of
judicial responsibilities and an eagerness to perform them
well.
Id. at 110. By the time of this tribute to Leflar, Justice Tate was on the Loui!li
ana Supreme Court and Chairman of the Appellate Judges' Conference, Section
of Judicial Administration, American Bar Association, which was then howwd

at Louisiana State University Law Center. Judge Tate's eagerness to judge wt>ll

was bolstered by his enormous energy, his scholarship, his seriousness of pur
pose, his love of justice and of life.

He exemplified Robert Leflar's Iifctinw

dream of improving the quality of the law through continuing education of tlw
judiciary.

See Robert A. Leflar, The Appellate Judges Seminar at New York

University, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 359 (1956); Robert A. Leflar, The Quality ol

Judges, 35 IND. L.J. 289 (1960). And Judge Tate's exemplar also inspired hi,;
colleagues.

Chief Justice John Dixon said of Al Tate: "'He kindled fires in hi,;

colleagues that made it possible for them to work hard together in an effort to do

ju stic�.'" Mack E. Barham, In Memoriam, Albert Tate, Jr. Judge of the Fifth
.
Circuit Court of Appeals, 1979-1986 Associate Justice, Supreme Court of L-01iisi
ana, 1970-1979, 47 LA. L. REV. 921, 921 (1987).
7.

See,

e.g.,

Albert

Tate,

Jr.,

Ville

Platte

in

1870,

30

L\.

GENEALOGICAL REG. 107 (1983); Albert Tate, Jr, 1860 Census of the Ville Plat fr
Area, 20 ATIAKAPAS GAZE'ITE 52 (1985).
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and last-a judge; that however much he desired to render com
mon sense justice under the facts, "the discipline of his craft," as
Judge Tate often called it, constrained him from administering
justice solely on his own idea of what was fair.8
This is the old theme of judicial freedom and judicial con
straint.9

I raise it anew because the question deeply concerned

Judge Tate, both in his decisions on the bench and in his ageless
academic writings.10

8. Albert Tate, jr., The Judge As a Person, 19 LA. L. REV. 438, 445
(1959). "But however much the appellate judge desires to render common sense
justice under the facts, certain restrictions-the discipline of his craft-inhibit
him from administering justice solely on his own idea of what is fair." Id. "[O]ur
legal system requires not only that equity be reached wherever possible in indi
vidual cases; it also requires some consistency and predictability of result based
upon past decisions," keeping in mind "the self restraint called for by the tradi
tion of our judiciary." Id. at 445, 446. In a very rare percentage of cases "the
individual views of the judges as to what is fair become decisive, due for exam
ple to the absence or conflict of prior precedents.

There, in these very rare

cases, the court is creatively free to apply the conflicting principles of law ad
vanced, in such a manner as to produce the result the court itself thinks is most
fair. " Id. at 446.

"[T]he vast mill-run of litigation neither requires nor allows

much free play of judicial discretion. " Albert Tate, Jr., The Law-Making Func

tion of the Judge, 28 LA. L. REV. 211, 211 (1968); see also id. at 233 ("courts do
possess and should exercise law-making responsibilities"; "judicial creativity is
an essential component of the process of deciding cases").

9.
See, e.g., Albert Tate, Jr., Book Review, 25 LA. L. REV. 577, 584
(196 5) (reviewing F'R.AN<;OIS GENY, METHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SO URC ES EN
DROIT

PRIVE POSITIF (Jaro Mayda & La. State Law Inst. trans. , W. Publ'g Co.

1963) (1899); Albert Tate, Jr., The "New" Judicial Solution: Occasions for and
Limits to Judicial Creativity, 54 TuL. L. REV. 877 (1980) .
10.
Like Benjamin Cardozo before him, The Nature of the Judicial
Process (1921), and Fran�ois Geny before Cardozo, Methode d'Interpretation et
Sources en Droit Prive Positif (P ari s, 1899), Louisiana's Judge Albert Tate, Jr.
subjected the judicial process to introspective scrutiny over a lifetime of extraju
dicial study and scholarship.

See, especially, his penetrating review of Jaro

Mayda's translation of Geny's Methode d'Interpretation et Sources en Droit Prive

Positif, in which he stated:

"For the reviewer, Geny's analysis and suggested

method was not just an X-ray showing the internal arrangement of the legal
system; it was more a sort of stethoscope, catching the living beat of the law in
action." Albert Tate, Jr., Book Review, 25 LA. L. REV. 577, 586 (1965). For other
of Judge Tate's extrajudicial writings on the judicial process not cited in the
annotations herein, see Albert Tate, Jr. , "Policy" in Judicial Decisions, 20 LA. L.
REV. 62 , 67, 75 (19 59) ("Policy, in the sense that justice is the aim and intent of
all legal system and procedures, is the spirit vitalizing the letters of the law";
"statutes and precedents are indeed the body of the law, 'policy'-or justice-is
its soul"); Albert Tate, Jr., Civilian Methodology in Louisiana, 44 TUL. L. REV.

SOUTHERN UNNERSITY LAW REVIEW

448

[Vol. 35.2

Only the other day I heard a lawyer who should know bet
ter say of Judge Tate that he was a perfect example of "the unre
strained judge."

My thesis is just opposite.

To be sure, Judge

Tate often gave voice to the great fundamental aim of the law
"To see that justice is done"11 -, but time and again he reiterated
the constraint, "within the framework of the law."12

In Judge

673 (1970); Albert Tate, Jr., Introduction to JARO MAYDA, FRANCOIS GENY AND
MODERN JURISPRUDENCE xvii (La. State Univ. Press, 1978); Albert Tate, Jr., The
Judge's Function and Methodology in Statutory Interpretation, 7 S.U. L. REV.
147 (1981). Judge Tate's impact on the law of Louisiana "rivaled that of Fran
.;ois-Xa·•ier Martin

and Edward Livingston,

and, like them, his influence

reached far beyond the borders of Louisiana." Warren M. Billings, Confessions
of a Court Historian, 35 LA. HIST. 261, 261 (1994). "Indeed, William J. Brennan
once ranked him as someone who would long be recalled for his contributions to
modern American jurisprudence." Id.

Judge Tate's extrajudicial writings have

recently been compiled in a volume published by the Pugh Institute for Justice,
Louisiana State University Law Center, REFLECTIONS ON LAW, LAWYERING, &
THE ESSAYS & .ARTICLES OF JUSTICE ALBERT TATE, JR. (George W.

JUDGING:

Pugh, Jr., ed., Pugh Inst. for Justice, La. State Univ. Law Ctr., 2006), with a
foreword by Judge James L. Dennis.

11.

See, e.g., Albert Tate, Jr., Techniques of Judicial Interpretation in

Louisiana, 22 LA. L. REV. 727, 754 (1962). Judge Tate described "the fundamen
tal aim of the judge in deciding the case-to decide it fairly. After all, a consci
entious judge is usually not trying to find the answer to

an

abstract legal co

nundrum; he is trying to do justice, to reach a fair and reasonable solution of a
conflict between the interests of human beings." Id. at 754.

12.

See, e.g., Albert Tate, Jr., the Justice Function of the Judge, 1 S.U.

L. REV. 250, 255 (1975). Judge Tate's contribution to the historic first volume of
the Southern University Law Review is historic itself. He rejects the "illusion"
that judges have no justice function.

Id. at 255.

"This view, surely, must be

myopic and mistaken. It overlooks the purpose supposedly animating the judi
cial system-to accomplish justice, within (it is true) a framework of objective
legal rule." Id.

"So strong is this urge toward justice (as the judge perceives it)

that occasionally it persuades him to adopt a solution that, at least on prima
facie analysis, is not only unauthorized b y legislation, but apparently contrary
to express text. A discussion of judicial creativity would be incomplete if it did
not touch upon this phenomenon."

Albert Tate, Jr., The "New" Judicial Solu

tion: Occasions for and Limits to Judicial Creativity, 54 TUL. L. REV. 877, 909

(1980).

In explicitly pursuing justice as an end in itself, Judge Tate built upon

the Common Law tradition traced by Benjamin Cardozo in his Storrs Lectures
at Yale, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921), adding his own insights de
rived from over thirty years of appellate judging in Louisiana's Civil Law sys
tem. Judge Tate realized the advantage he had, working as a Louisiana mixed
law judge, over his common law counterpart:

"Because of the differences in

judicial function founded upon our civilian heritage, the Louisiana mixed-law
judge has doctrinally available to him more advantageous techniques and per
spectiv�s than those of his common law counterpart." Albert Tate, Jr., The Role
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Tate's own words, "[O]ur legal system requires not only that eq
uity be reached wherever possible in individual cases; it also re
quires some consistency and predictability of result based upon
. .
,,
13
past d ec1s10ns .
.

.

.

I shall speak only of a few civil rights suits, one of which is
currently pending in the Supreme Court of the United States.14 I
know civil liberties cases better than others. Sonie of them, I

am

told, require great agonizing in the conference room.
I should add that in preparing my remarks I sought the
help of my colleague Cheney Joseph, who unraveled Judge Tate's
Sepulvado15 opinion for me.

Some of you may know the molar

step taken by Justice Tate for the Louisiana Supreme Court in
1979. Remember this date, 1979. It will be important later.

Justice Tate's opinion for the Supreme Court in State v.
Sepulvado read Article I, Section 20 of the Louisiana Constitution
of 1974, which prohibits subjecting any person "'to cruel, exces
sive, or unusual punishment"'-! emphasize "excessive" -as add
ing a new constitutional dimension to state judicial review of
criminal sentences. 16

"By it, the excessiveness of a sentence be

comes a question of law reviewable under the appellate jurisdic
tion of this court,"17 said Justice Tate.
I am sure this audience knows the word "excessive" does not
appear in the federal Eighth Amendment.18
Frankie Sepulvado's sentence of three and a half years at
hard labor for carnal knowledge of a juvenile-Frankie was
eighteen, Jamie S., fifteen and a half.-was set aside by Justice
Tate as violative of Article I, Section 20.19

"[I]t is necessary to

of the Judge in Mixed Jurisdictions: The Louisiana Experience, 20 LoY. L. REV.

231, 242 (1974). Judge Tate reflected in his own work-ways the genius of Fran
�ois Geny, fostering, with the help of Chief Justice Dixon, Justice Barham, and
Justice Calogero, a Renaissance of the Civilian Tradition in Louisiana jurispru
dence.
13.
Albert Tate, jr., The Judge as a Person, 19 LA. L. REV. 438, 445
(1959).
14.

Rankin v. McPherson, No. 85-208, October Term, 1986.

15.
16.
17.

Id. at 764 (quoting LA. CONST. art. I, §20).

19.

Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d at 764, 773.

State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762 (La. 1979).

Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d at 764 (citing LA. CONST. art. V, §5(C)).
18.
See generally id. at 764-65 (explaining the "excessiveness" factor in
the Eighth Amendment ).
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consider the context in which t h e illegal conduct occurred, "20 said
Justice Tate, for whom context was always key.
So it is for is for all great judges.
Here is an excerpt of Justice Tate's thinking in Frankie
Sepulvado's case:
Without applauding the sexual permissiveness of
the times, we can only note that in the social con
text of the times this type of offense between young
people is committed man y times without criminal
prosecution and that, in ordinary sentencing prac
tice, it is not regarded s o serious as to require im.
1
pnsonmen t.2
Surely this would sound fair to a barber in Ville Platte,
which was Judge Tate's way of testing his opinions for the court.
Frankie Sepulvado owes his freedom to Judge Tate, who
himself was free to impose a new judicial duty upon his court.
Fortunately, the law of Louisiana's Constitution of 1974,
which he helped write, allowed Judge Tate to satisfy his sense of
justice. It was not always this way, however.
The law of the First Amendment also requires analysis of
the context of Ardith McPherson's harsh words. She may owe her
continued government employment to the sensitivity of the Fifth
Circuit and to Judge Tate, w h o reversed a summary judgment
against her. 22 McPherson was fired from her job as a deputy con
stable for a remark she made after hearing of the attempted as
sassination o f President Reagan.23 "[l]f they go for him again, I
hope they get him," she told a co-worker at lunch.24 The remark
capped what McPherson, a black woman, thought was a private
tete-a-tete expressing opposition t o the President's policies cutting
back on welfare and ignoring blacks.25 McPherson v. Ranki n is
one of the many public employee lawsuits requiring judges to ap-

20.
21.

Id. at 771.
Id.

22 .

McPherson

v.

Rankin, 736 F.2d 175, 177 (5th Cir. 1984); rev'd and

v.

Rankin, 786 F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1986), affd by,
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).

remanded by, McPherson
23.
24.
25.

McPherson, 736 F.2d at 177.
Id. at 177 n.2.
Id. at 177.
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ply the Pickering I Connick "balancing test": A judicial weighing
of the First Amendment interest in protecting public employees'
freedom of expression against the government's interest in main
taining discipline and efficiency in the workplace.26 The case is a
challenging civil liberties litigation that has twice hit the Fifth
Circuit.
The district court thought McPherson's remark unprotected
as a matter of law, but Judge Tate identified several issues of
material fact preventing summary judgment.27
Constable Rankin thought that McPherson was serious;
McPherson testified, "I didn't mean anything by it."28 Said Judge
Tate: "The issue of McPherson's intent is relevant to the present
inquiry because it is imperative that a court's characterization of
speech as political expression, for purposes of First Amendment
protection, be predicated upon consideration of its 'content, form,
and context.'"29
Some may say McPherson's intent is irrelevant; she said
what she said. But the context of the speech is especially mate
rial. If McPherson truly meant her remark as a form of political
hyperbole, not as advocacy of harm to the President, then the

Pickering I Connick balance would seem to weigh in her favor.30
At any rate, summary judgment is simply too blunt an in
strument in these public employee, free speech cases. Balancing
the competing interests requires a razor, not a meat axe, even in
the face of a public employee's blunt tongue.
On remand the district court again ruled against McPher
son, explaining from the bench: "I'm not sure that the real ques
tion in this case is what she meant. . . . I don't believe she meant
nothing, as she said here today, and I don't believe that those
words were mere political hyperbole. They were something more
than political hyperbole. They expressed such dislike of a high
pu blic governmental official as to be violent words, in context."31

30.

Id. at 179.
Id. at 177-78.
Id. at 177 n. 3.
McPherson, 736 F.2d at 178-79.
See id. at 180.

31.

McPherson v. Rankin, 786 F.2d 12 33, 12 35 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting

26.
27.
28.
29.

the district court opinion).
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In holding that McPherson's remark was not protected
speech, the district court concluded that McPherson actually
hoped that the President would be killed-a dubious finding of
fact-and that, at any rate, Constable Rankin is not required to
employ a law enforcement officer who favors political assassina
tion-a conclusion of law hard to dispute.32 In Constable Rankin's
colorful words, he ought not be required to employ a person who
"rides with the cops and cheers for the robbers."33 The difficulty,
as you might guess, is that Ardith M cPherson is not a cop; all she
does is sit at a computer all day, in a room with no phone, closed
to the public, "enter[ing] data from court papers into a computer's
,, 4
memory .... 3
I wonder what Judge Tate would have done with Ardith
McPherson's case the second time up?

We will never know; it

reached the Fifth C ircuit the same month Judge Tate died.
The second time up, McPherson's case fell into the hands of
a younger judge, one whose intellect and judicial sensitivity seem
to

me lineal to

Judge

Tate's.

I

speak

of Judge

Patrick

Higginbotham, whom you have already heard on this program,
another of Al Tate's great admirers.

His presence on the Fifth

Circuit keeps its landscape vital.
Judge Higginbotham reversed,35 holding as a matter of law
that McPherson's remark considered in its context-whether po
litical hyperbole or an actual wish for the president's assassina
tion-addressed a matter of public concern, and that "the value of
protecting her right to express her opinion, however loathsome,"
outweighed the competing interest in effective and efficient law
enforcement.36 The court agreed that a law enforcement agency
need not employ officers who favor political assassination, but
Judge Higginbotham cut a finer line.

"The difficulty with the

government's position," said the court, "is that McPherson's du
ties were so utterly ministerial and her potential for undermining
the office's mission so trivial."37

She was not a law enforcement

officer; she had no contact with the public; she had no access to

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1237.
at 1235.
at 123 8.
at 1239.
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In these distinct circumstances, the court held

that McPherson could not be fired for expressing her political
opinion.38 Here is the closing part of Judge Higginbotham's opin
ion for the Fifth Circuit: "Political liberty will best be secured in
the long haul," said Judge Higginbotham, "if the government tol
erates as much diversity of opinion as its responsibilities will al
low. Our first amendment jurisprudence is a boast that in a free
society foolish ideas will fall of their own weight.

The ideal of

tolerance is sometimes sorely taxed in practice-when that hap
pens, there is all the more reason to recall its long-term benefits.
However ill-considered Ardith McPherson's opinion was, it did
not make her unfit for her lowly job in Constable Rankin's of
fice."39
Surely this is sensitive writing. Whether the result is right
and whether the Fifth Circuit's reasoning will hold up on certio
rari remains to be seen. Ardith McPherson's case is currently in
the crucible of the Supreme Court.
If I were asked to predict what will happen, I would say the
Supreme Court will reverse the Fifth Circuit. But I am confident
that Judge Tate, from his ultimate chambers, favors a judgment
for Ardith McPherson. So do I.4°
The last time I saw Judge Tate alive he was in the company
of Justice Harry A. Blackmun.

There was boyish laughter be

tween these two humble men. As fate would have it, they would
never see each other again.
Justice Blackmun has a vote in Ardith McPherson's case.
He is free to favor freedom.
One more case and I have done.

W hat if the law and the

judge's sense of justice conflict? What then?
One of my students put this very question to Judge Tate.
We had bridged the gap between our protected academic cloister
and the Judge's chambers in New Orleans.

38.
39.

We were there on a

Id.
Id.

The author's prediction was wrong, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa.
(5-4
His hope, however, was fulfilled. Rankin v. M cPherson, 483 U.S. 378 ( 1987)
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field trip, in pursuit of a confidential chat on the judicial process.
Judge Tate allowed me to tape record the session. I want you to
hear his answer.

Perhaps the best tribute I can pay to Judge

Tate is to offer his own voice41 in proof that he was first and last a
judge.
By way of essential background, I must tell you that in a
42
v. James, Justice Tate overruled a large body of

case called State

jurisprudence requiring the reversal and dismissal of a criminal
prosecution where there was technical failure of the indictment to
allege all the essential elements of the crime. No other American
jurisdiction has such a strict rule, which makes no sense under
modern conditions of criminal practice and procedure.43
Second, I must tell you that State

v.

Jimmy Ray Malmay,44

which is the subject of the taped conversation, was decided after

41.

Cf Paul Tho mpson, THE VOICE OF THE PAST, ORAL HISTORY 225-26

(1978):
[T]he real justification of history is not in giving an immortal
ity to a few of the old. It is part of the way in which the living
understand their place and part in the world .... [H]istory can
help people see how they stand, and where they should go .. ..
And in giving a past, it also helps them towards a future of
their own making.
42.
43.

305 So. 2d 514 (La. 1974).
In his historic contribution to the first volume of the Southern
University Law Review, Justice Tate explained:
This is not to say that judicially adopted policies of criminal
procedure may not be revised when the abuse they were de
signed to prevent is no longer a threat. For instance, until re
cently there was an overly strict requirement of a perfect in
dictment, which resulted in the dismissal sua sponte on appeal
of prosecutions founded on defective indictments, even though
the issue was not raised prior to conviction and even though
there was no prejudice. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 275 So. 2d
733 (La. 1973). This could be (and was) judicially modified un
der twentieth centµry conditions, which afford more opportu
nity prior to trial for an accused to learn of the details o f the
charge against him [than] in the days when the indictment
was the only notice given to the accused of the offense charged.
State v. James, 305 So.2d 514 (La.1974).
Albert Tate, Jr., The Justice Function of the Judge 1 S.U. L.REV. 250 260 n.25
'
'
(1975).
44.

31 5 So.2d 286 (La. 1975).
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the James case, in 1975, four years before Judge Tate freed the
Louisiana Supreme Court to review criminal sentences for exces
siveness.
When we were in chambers, Judge Tate couldn't remember
the name of the case, but then it hit him-"Malmay! Jimmy Ray
Malmay, up from Sabine, up from Many, near Many." He rushed
over to the reports that lined his wall and, as if by magic, he
pulled down 315 So.2d-all without looking up the citation.

Ob

viously, this case burned deeply in the Judge's memory.
I have to add that Judge Tate's desk was so cluttered I

didn't see the small pocket radio that was playing when I set the
tape recorder down.

The haunting music you will hear in the

background wasn't my idea. But in this audience, I believe Judge
Tate's voice will be heard.
Finally, as you listen to the voice of Louisiana's Judge Tate,
I want you to see my favorite picture of the Judge. I made a side

trip the other day to The Times-Picayune to get it. It appeared on
the cover of a Lagniappe feature article on Judge Tate entitled
"Breaking Up the Bench.m5
Carlyle in his essay on portraiture says he would give more
for a single picture of a man, whatever it was, than for all the
books that might be written of him.

The portrait is "a small

lighted candle by which the Biographies could for the first time
be read, and some human interpretation made of them; the Bi
ographied Personage ... yielding at last some features which one
could admit to be human.''46
[House lights down; image on screen.]
My student asked Judge Tate to give an example of a case
in which his sense of justice was outraged by what had happened,
but there was nothing the Judge could do about it. Judge Tate's
answer recalls one of the hardest things in his whole life:
[The Voice of Judge Tate.]

Claire Jupiter, Breaking Up the Bench, New Orleans States-Item
(Lagniappe), Sept. 6, 1975, at 3.
46.
Thomas Carlyle, Exhibition of Scottish Portraits (1854), in XVI
THE WORKS OF THOMAS CARLYLE: CRITICAL AND MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS 5 14, 515
(Collier ed. 1897).
45.
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Oh, I'll give you, I'll give you the-one of the hard
est things in my whole life.

It's a case called, uh,

State versus Jimmy, uh, State versus Jimmy Malva
or something; he's in, probably in the penitentiary,
poor guy.

Uh, and, uh, the situation in this case

from Sabine, up from Many, near Many. The situa
tion in that case was [walks to wall and pulls
down] -uh, 315 So.2d-the situation in that case
was, we had been working hard to reform the juris
prudence on indictments, which as you may know
for a while was awfully, awfully technical in Lou
isiana.

It said if you left out a word negligently,

even if you didn't raise it and had the trial, you
could reverse 'em on appeal-I forget the line of
cases.

And we finally got rid of it.

And, inciden

tally, one of the bad things about that, in applica
tion, it would depend upon, very often,-and this is
one reason my good friend John Dixon might not
have been crazy about overruling it-but in appli
cation, if it was

an

absolute, terri ble

injustice,

somebody would find some little ol' indictment in
formality and reverse, but it wasn't consistent and
it didn't make sense, you see. So we finally got the
thing straight.
Now, Jimmy Ray Malmay comes up.

Here's the

situation: A kid from the wrong side of the tracks,
uh, let's see, I think 19 years of age, uh, sold, uh,
who gave a minister's boy in Many for a dollar a
marijuana cigarette, for a dollar-17-year-old boy.
Now if they had been one month less, this would
have been about a year in the p arish pen at most,
but instead there's a fifteen-year-in-the peniten
tiary goddam thing. And I knew the facts were so
terrible three guys were just itching to reverse.
And the only reversal could be on resurrecting the
goddam worthless, ridiculous business of the in
dictment technicality.
And I sat there and I cried that night, I really cried
because I knew-I didn't reverse, and I got four
votes to affirm-but I knew I was throwing that kid

2008]
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on the scrap heap, that everybody had thrown him
on the scrap heap, 'cause he-he, he wasn't going to
be a hero, he was going to be a petty thief or some
thing-but he was not going to be a damn felon in
the penitentiary.
And that was the hardest thing I ever had to do in
my life, come to think.

Because I could have, I

could have switched so easy, you know.

But I

wouldn't have been true, in my mind, to what doc
trine was about.
At that time, you see, we couldn't review sentences
for excessiveness.

Thank God, since '74 we'd have

had no problem with that. 47
[Tape off; house lights up.]
I will add but a word, what Holmes said in one of his com
memorative speeches:
When a great tree falls, we are surprised to see
how meager the landscape seems without it.

So

when a great man dies. We may not have been in
timate with him; it is enough that he was within
our view; when he is gone, life seems thinner and
less interesting. . . .

We shall be fortunate enough

if we shall have learned to look into the face of fate
and the unknown with a smile like his.48

Adieu, mon ami.49

47.
Audio Tape: Confidential Chat on the Judicial Process, Chambers
of Judge Albert Tate, Jr., United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
New Orleans, Louisiana (Mar. 16, 1982) (on file in author's archives).
48.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Sidney Bartlett (1889), in THE
0cCASIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, supra note 1, at 5455.
49.
In recalling the voice of Louisiana's Judge Albert Tate, Jr. after

twenty years, let us add that Judge Tate realized his own fallibility, indeed he
acknowledged that the law is produced and a dministered by fallible human
beings:
But [this] ... realization[,] .. . rather than decreasing our re
spect for the judicial process, should inspire admiration for the
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human achievement in formulating from myriad efforts our
great system of law. We may well be struck by the wonder and
miracle of human intelligence and human integrity which, de
spite the imperfections of the human agents who are the con
stituent parts of our judicial process, produce in the majesty of
the law a legal system whose breadth and compassion and
fairness and intellect distills from these imperfect human con
tributions a substance fi n er and fairer than could be imagined
by any of the mortals who contributed their best thought and
most selfless service to this end.

The Judge as a Person, 19
cat in pace, cher ami.

Albert Tate, jr.,

LA. L. REV. 438, 447

(1959). Requies

